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CAT IN THE HAT MOVES TO MICIllGAN; 
EXPERT WITNESSES AND THEIR PROPONENTS 
CURSE DR. SEUSS 
Susan H Bitensky· 
2002 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 835 
The water ran out. 
And then I SAW THE RING! 
A ring in the tub! 
And, oh boy! What a thing! 
A big long pink cat ring! 
It looked like pink ink! 
And I said, "Will this ever 
Come off? I don't think!" 
* * * * 
It was all one big spot now 
All over the yard! 
But the Big Cat stood there 
And he said, "This is good."! 
INTRODUCTION 
In the popular children's book The Cat in The Hat Comes Back,2 a rather 
presumptuous and decidedly mischievous cat creates a "big long pink cat ring" 
• Professor of Law, Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law. B.A. 1971, 
Case Western Reserve University; J.D. 1974, University of Chicago Law School. I would like 
to thank law students Meghan Kennedy and Lara Lenzotti for their excellent research assistance 
in connection with this project. Of course, any errors herein are the author's sole responsibility. 
This article is based on my paper entitled "Using and Defusing Expert Witnesses: Case 
Law Update in the Federal and Michigan State Courts," (June 21, 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author, presented in Traverse City, Michigan, at the Michigan Defense 
Trial Counsels' 2002 Summer Conference program, Using and Defusing Expert Witnesses: 
Cutting Edge Law and Practice for Trial Lawyers). 
I. DR. SEUSS, THE CAT IN THE HAT COMES BACK! 14, 52 (1986). 
2. See id. 
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in a bathtub, much to the consternation of the children whose bathtub it is.3 
The cat assures them, 
"Have no fear ofthat ring," 
Laughed the Cat in the Hat. 
"Why, I can take cat rings 
Off tubs. Just like that!,>4 
As it turns out, the cat's efforts result in the pink ring spreading ominously, 
first to mom's white dress,s and then, one after the other, to a whole wall,6 
dad's shoes,' the hall rug,8 dad's bed,9 thetelevision,lo and finally, to the snow 
surrounding the children's house. ll In short, the pink bathtub ring is 
transfonned into a gigantic pink blob of a spot. The cat has made a not-so-bad 
mess unbelievably worse. 
The cat in the hat is not alone in this regard. In my opinion, Michigan's 
state legislature and courts have also made a not-so-bad mess much worse in 
relation to the rules on admitting expert witness testimony. However, the cat, 
with the assistance of some little hyperactive cats residing in the big cat's 
hat,12 is ultimately able to get rid of the pink spot. 13 If only Michigan were so 
lucky! Its "pink spot" has not even begun to fade. 
I. THE EXTENT OF THE "PINK SPOT" IN MICHIGAN 
In order to understand what Michigan has done, it is necessary to 
understand how the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (FRE) governing admissibility of expert witness testimony. 
Reviewing this background is important because the architects of Michigan ' s 
rules on this subject appear to have used the U.S. Supreme Court's 
interpretations as a springboard for fashioning a Michigan variant or two. 
The federal judicial precedents to which I refer are now thought of as a 
ground breaking trilogy in evidence law: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
3. /d. at 14. 
4. [d. at 16. 
5. See id. at 16, 19. 
6. See id. at 21. 
7. See DR. SEUSS, supra note 1, at 23. 
8. See id. at 24-25. 
9. See id. at 28-29. 
10. See id. at 38. 
11. See id. at 40. 
12. See id. at 32-63. 
13. See DR. SEUSS, supra note 1, at 59,61. 
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 14 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, IS and Kumho Tire Co. 
v. Carmichael. 16 Daubert, in ruling on the admissibility of expert opinion that 
Bendectin causes birth defects, is most famous for rather unceremoniously 
tossing out the Frye testl7 as the gold standard for judging the admissibility of 
novel scientific expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (FRE 702).18 Frye actually predated the codified FRE by half a 
century, being derived from a 1923 citation-free decision in Frye v. United 
States l9 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District ofColumbia.20 
Thus, Frye did double duty, initially by guiding the common law development 
of evidentiary principles and then in fleshing out our early understanding of 
FRE 702 vis-a-vis admissibility of scientific expert testimony.21 
The Frye case arose over the question of admissibility of expert opinion 
testimony predicated upon the results of the systolic blood pressure deception 
test, a primitive precursor to the polygraph machine.22 The Frye court came 
up with a standard for distinguishing when the basis of an expert's proffered 
scientific opinion testimony would be reliable enough so as to warrant 
admitting the testimony into evidence. Frye dictated that the basis for such 
testimony "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance 
in the particular field in which it belongs.,,23 
Frye arose and gained currency, of course, to help judges determine what 
is ''junk science" and what is not - the former posing a danger of unduly 
impressing jurors because it parades as science when it really is not. The Frye 
test makes good sense in certain respects; the test implicitly recognizes that 
most judges are not trained as scientists, and that, therefore, it might be a valid 
idea for the sorting process to belong to the scientific community rather than 
to jurists.24 
14. 509 U.S. 579(1993). 
15. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
16. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
17. The Frye test was announced in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 
1923). The substance of the test appears in the text above. 
18. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585, 589, 597 (1993). 
19. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
20. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
21. The Frye test held sway in the federal courts until Daubert was rendered. See id. 
at 585,589. 
22. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14. 
23. Id. at 1014. 
24. See Adina Schwartz, A "Dogma a/Empiricism" Revisted: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight a/Frye v. United 
States, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 149, 196 (1997); Lawrence B. Ebert, Comment, Frye after 
Daubert: The Role a/Scientists in Admissibility Issues as Seen through Analysis a/the DNA 
Profiling Cases, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 219,245-46,253 (1993). 
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The scholarly debates over Frye have been extensive.2s One of the 
biggest criticisms coming from the anti-Frye wing is that the test leaves no 
room for the admissibility of new and brilliant science that is so ahead of its 
time, there is no "general acceptance" to be had in the relevant scientific 
field. 26 For example, under the Frye test, would the likes of a Galileo be 
permitted to testify? Galileo, it will be recalled, was condemned by the 
Catholic Church for defending Copernicus' theory that the planets revolve 
around the sun instead ofvice-versa.27 If Galileo had attempted to give his 
expert opinion on this matter in a seventeenth-century court of law bound by 
the Frye test, he would never have testified. That would not be a sound result 
then and certainly not now in an era of ever expanding reliance on science-
based technological achievement. 
However, when, after seventy years, the Daubert Court tossed Frye, it 
ostensibly did not do so over concern about the potential Galileo phenomenon. 
Rather, the Court repudiated the Frye standard because it is inconsistent with 
and superseded by the FRE and especially FRE 702.28 FRE 702, prior to 
Daubert and its progeny and minus the most recent ensuing amendments to 
the rules, provided: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.,,29 The opinion for the Court in Daubert notes that there is nothing 
in the text or history ofFRE 702 that indicates inclusion of Frye's "general 
25. See, e.g., Bert Black et aI., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New 
Searchfor Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. REv. 715, 722-27, 739-40 (1994 )(referring to the 
Frye debate and detailing the pros and cons of the Frye test); Cassandra C. Colchagoff, A New 
Era for Science and the Law: The Face of Scientific Evidence in the Federal Courts After 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 29 TuLSA LJ. 735, 740-42 (1994) (surveying 
the arguments for and against Frye); Alma Kelley McLeod, Note, Is Frye Dying or Is Daubert 
Doomed?: Determining the Standard of Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in Alabama Courts, 
51 ALA. L. REv. 883, 886-89 (2000) (reviewing criticisms and defenses of Frye); Schwartz, 
supra note 24, at 193-205 (taking a position in favor ofa revamped Frye standard); Alan W. 
Tamarelli, Jr., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: Pushing the Limits of Scientific 
Reliability- The Questionable Wisdom of Abandoning the Peer Review Standardfor Admitting 
Expert Testimony, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1175, 1196-98 (1994)(attackingFrye); Ebert, supra note 
24, at 232-53 (defending Frye); Troy M. Horton, Comment, The Debate Is Over: Frye Lives No 
More, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 379, 383-88 (1994) (contending that Frye was misguided). 
26. Some writers speak ofa "cultural lag" caused by Frye's conservatism, resulting in 
a discrepancy between novel sound science and the inadmissibility of expert opinion testimony 
based upon such science. See, e.g., Colchagoff, supra note 25, at 735-36. 
27. See A. Mark Smith, Galileo, 8 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCWPEDIA 11,11-12(2001). 
28. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-90. 
29. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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acceptance" test. 30 Indeed, the thrust of the federal evidence rules favors 
relaxing traditional barriers to opinion testimony, by experts or others.31 
But what to put in the Frye test's place? Daubert finds the answer in the 
words of FRE 702. First, the Court reasoned, the rule's reference to 
"scientific knowledge" gives rise to a requirement of "evidentiary reliability," 
i.e., the experts' inferences or assertions must be more than unsupported 
speculation and must be derived by means of scientific method.32 Second, the 
Court explained, the rule's insistence that experts' testimony must "assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,,33 
establishes a relevancy requirement, i.e., in order for such testimony to assist 
the trier of fact, it must be scientifically relevant to resolving an issue in the 
case.34 The Blackmun opinion illustrates the latter concept with a memorable 
example: expert testimony concerning the phases of the moon -let us say, that 
the moon was full on May 6th - would assist the jury and be scientifically 
relevant in ascertaining whether the night was not impenetrably dark on May 
6th, provided that visibility on that night is a fact in issue.35 However, this 
testimony may not be scientifically relevant to ascertaining whether a person 
behaved like a madman on the night of May 6th even ifhis insanity was a fact 
in issue.36 Why? Because the presence of a full moon has not been to date 
scientifically linked with human irrationality. In short, the relevancy 
requirement built into FRE 702 mandates "a valid scientific connection to the 
pertinent inquiry.'>37 
But, returning to the reliability prong ofFRE 702, the Daubert decision 
tried to dissect what is entailed in assuring that this requirement is properly 
fulfilled.38 The Court elaborated that the reliability prong entails a preliminary 
assessment by the trial judge as to whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying an expert's opinion testimony is scientifically valid.39 The Court 
identified four factors that trial judges, as the so-called gatekeepers deciding 
whether to let in scientific expert testimony, might want to use in assessing 
reliability: 
30. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89. 
31. As the Daubert Court put it, Frye is "at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal 
Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony.'" 
[d. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 {I 988». 
32. See id. at 589-90. 
33. [d. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). 
34. See id. at 591-92. 
35. See id. at 591. 
36. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 
37. [d. at 591-92. 
38. See id. at 589-94. 
39. See id. at 592-93. 
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1. Whether a theory or technique can be and has been tested;40 
2. "[W]hether [a] theory or technique has been subjected to peer review 
and publication;,,41 
3. "[T]he known or potential rate of error [for use of a particular 
scientific technique] and the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique's operation;,,42 and/or 
4. Identification of a relevant scientific community and a determination 
as to the particular degree of acceptance of a theory or technique 
within that community.43 
Notice that the fourth factor essentially mimics the Frye test. So, what is 
going on here? Was the Supreme Court playing a not very subtle game with 
us - rejecting Frye in terms, but retaining it in substance? Daubert was not 
a game of judicial peekaboo. That is because the fourth factor - the Frye 
factor - is not mandatory and is only one of multiple factors that may be taken 
into account.44 The Court in Daubert expressly cautioned the bar that the four 
factors were not meant to be a "definitive checklist";45 judges are free to use 
any combination of them, anyone of them alone, none of them at all, or even 
as of yet unidentified factors, so long as the factors chosen further making the 
reliability determination.46 
The other case in the U.S. Supreme Court's trilogy that concerns us here 
is Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.47 In the process of addressing the 
admissibility of a tire failure analyst's expert testimony to the effect that a tire 
on the Carmichael's minivan failed due to a manufacturing or design defect,48 
Kumho notably answered two questions left open by Daubert. To what other 
kinds of evidence, besides scientific expert testimony, do the 
reliability/scientific relevancy requirements apply,49 and, ifthe requirements 
40. See id. at 593. 
41. Jd.at593. 
42. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (citations omitted). 
43. See id. at 594. 
44. See id. at 592-95. That the fourth factor is not mandatory is the obvious inference 
of the Daubert Court's observation that the factors mentioned in its opinion do not constitute 
a "definitive checklist." See id. at 593. 
45. See id. at 593. 
46. See id. at 593-95 (stating that "[ m]any factors will bear on the [reliability] inquiry," 
that the Court was not presuming to set forth a "definitive checklist," and that "[t]he inquiry 
envisioned by Rule 702 is ... a flexible one."). 
47. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
48. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,143-45 (1999). 
49. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141, 147. 
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do apply to other expert evidence, what factors should a trial judge employ in 
determining the reliability of non-scientific expert evidence?so 
The Supreme Court held in Kumho that the reliability and scientific 
relevancy requirements under FRE 702 do indeed apply to all expert 
testimony - and not just to expert testimony grounded on scientific 
knowledge.sl Thus, on the reliability front, where non-scientific expert 
testimony's factual foundation, data, principles, methods, or their application 
are called sufficiently into question, the trial judge must determine whether 
the testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the 
pertinent discipline.s2 Moreover, the Court held that in gauging reliability, a 
trial judge may consider any factor(s) that would help determine a particular 
expert testimony's reliability.s3 Trial judges may use any of the Daubert 
factors or ignore them entirely and use other, as of yet unspecified factors - as 
long as a selected factor or factors is reasonably relevant to establishing 
reliability.s4 For instance, see the subsequent case of First Tennessee Bank 
National Ass'n v. Barreto,Ss in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit ruled that none ofthe Daubert reliability factors were applicable to the 
non-scientific expert witness' testimony in issue, but found another, non-
Daubert factor pertinent to establishing the reliability required by FRE 702.S6 
In order to be pertinent for this purpose, Kumho provides that trial judges 
should consider the nature of the issue presented in a case, the expert's 
particular expertise, and the subject of his or her testimony.s7 Otherwise, 
federal law accords a district court broad latitude in deciding how to judge 
reliability.s8 
These, in a nutshell, are the current principles binding the lower federal 
courts when faced with deciding the admissibility of expert witness testimony 
under FRE 702. Of course, they are not the only principles dealing with 
admissibility of expert witness evidence; other federal rules of evidence, as 
applicable, should enter into the calculus as well. But, Daubert and Kumho, 
taken together, represent the standards that, at a minimum, must come into 
play for the federal judicial system whenever a challenge is made under FRE 
702 to proffered expert testimony on the theory that the testimony is not 
50. See id. at 141-42. 
51. See id. at 141. 
52. See id. at 149. 
53. See id. at 150-53. 
54. See id. at 141-42, 150-53. 
55. 268 F.3d 319 (6th Cir. 2001). 
56. See First Tenn. Bank Nat'! Ass'n v. Barreto, 268 F.3d 319,333-35 (6th Cir. 2001). 
57. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150. 
58. See id. at 142, 152-53. 
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"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" and that such testimony 
will not "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue. "S9 
Indeed, FRE 702 was amended on December 1, 2000, expressly to 
incorporate the Daubert-Kumho principles so as to liberalize admissibility 
standards for expert opinion testimony. The amended rule now reads as 
follows: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient 
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case.
60 
It should be highlighted that the amendment necessitates trial court scrutiny 
not only of the principles and methods used by the expert, but also whether 
those principles and methods have been properly applied to the facts of the 
case. Furthermore, amended FRE 702 does not codify any of the factors that 
may be consulted by trial judges in making reliability determinations. As 
Kumho instructed, the new federal rule leaves the identification and utilization 
of reliability factors in the broad discretion of trial courts. 
So, in the federal system, what are some of the other reliability factors, 
besides the "Daubert four," that trial judges have been using? A smattering 
of examples attests to the fact that trial judges have not been wanting in 
creativity in rising to the challenges initiated by Daubert: 
1. Some trial courts have considered whether an expert is proposing to 
testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research 
the expert has conducted independent of the litigation, or whether he 
or she has developed opinions expressly for purposes of testifying. 
The former circumstance militates in favor of admissibility while the 
latter does not.61 
2. Some trial courts have focused on whether an expert has unjustifiably 
extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion. 
59. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
60. Id. 
61. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). 
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
found inadmissible plaintiffs' experts' testimony that Bendectin caused shortening oflimbs; the 
court was so persuaded because, among other things, the experts' underlying research was 
conducted solely for purposes of the Bendectin litigation. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317. 
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If an expert has done so, a court will be inclined to deny 
admissibility.62 
3. Some trial judges have found a key factor to be whether experts, in 
arriving at their opinions, have been as careful as they would be in the 
course of their professional work outside of their role as paid 
litigation consultants. If the experts have not been careful to this 
degree, these judges will exclude the experts' testimony.63 
4. There are trial courts that are especially influenced by whether the 
area of expertise of an expert typically yields reliable results for the 
type of opinion the expert is called upon to give. If the area of 
expertise does not generally produce such results, the courts will 
exclude the proffered opinion testimony.64 
5. Trial courts will also usually exclude expert opinion testimony that is 
based only on the expert's own experience with patients or on a few 
case studies.6s 
6. Finally, some trial judges are swayed by whether an expert has 
sufficiently accounted for obvious alternative explanations for a 
phenomenon, and, if he or she has not provided such an accounting, 
the judges will exclude the expert's opinion testimony about the 
phenomenon.66 
A point of interest with respect to the last factor mentioned above is that 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has sensibly. modified it so that to 
be admissible on the matter of causation, the expert witness' opinion 
testimony need not always eliminate every other conceivable cause of injury. 
In Nemir v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc.,67 an automobile accident 
case, the court ruled that Thomas Horton, plaintiff s expert witness and an 
engineer with extensive training in seatbelt design, could testify that plaintiff's 
62. See, e.g., Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 1996). In this 
case, the expert's testimony was rejected because he extrapolated, without any scientific basis, 
from the accepted premise that Clomid causes certain birth defects to the conclusion that it must 
also have caused plaintitrs hemifacial microsomia See Lust, 89 F.3d at 597-98. 
63. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997). 
64. See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chern., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 277-79 (5th Cir. 1998) (en 
bane). 
65. See, e.g., Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 765, 765 n.18, 767, 767 n.23 
(E.D. Va 1995), ajJ'd in part, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996). 
66. See, for example, Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 
1994), approving of the lower court's exclusion of plaintiffs' experts' testimony that plaintiffs' 
injuries were due to exposure to toxic chemicals, where the experts had not investigated any 
other possible causes of those injuries. 
67. 6 Fed. App. 266 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
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seatbelt became unlatched due to a design defect even though other 
possibilities existed with respect to causation.68 The appellate court explained 
that the fact that several alternative causes for the latch's failure might have 
remained uneliminated only went to the accuracy of Horton's conclusion, not 
to the reliability of his underlying methodology and, hence, not to 
admissibility.69 The appellate judges observed that the lower court had erred 
in requiring that Horton have knowledge of an exact cause of the failure in 
order to testify on causation.70 This modification thus makes it possible for 
experts to testify on causation without their proponents bearing the exorbitant 
expense that might well be involved in discounting every conceivable other 
causal theory. 
A related principle was expounded by the same court of appeals in 
Greenwell v. Boatwright,71 litigation also arising from a vehicular crash. At 
trial, defendant had introduced the testimony of accident reconstructionist 
expert, Kenneth Razak, on the issue of causation.72 In arriving at his 
conclusion, Razak relied solely on physical evidence obtained from the 
accident and chose to ignore eyewitnesses' testimony inasmuch as that 
testimony was contradictory and as he claimed that he had no principled 
reason for preferring one eyewitness version of events over another.73 The 
appeals court held that expert testimony opining as to the cause of the accident 
was not inadmissible simply because it contradicted some eyewitness 
testimony, in the same case, offering a different cause.74 The court cautioned, 
however, that Razak's opinion testimony would have been inadmissible if the 
facts upon which the expert founded his testimony contradicted the other 
evidence adduced at triaFS 
The above exposition describes the law on expert opinion testimony 
governing the federal court system. Although these legal developments are 
not without problems, the federal body of law appears reasonably coherent, 
consistent, and logical. Unfortunately, not as much can be said for Michigan 
where cat-in-the-hat-type mischief has definitely been afoot in relation to that 
state's laws on expert testimony. There has evolved a series of state legislated 
rules and state judicial interpretations of rules that, considered as a whole, do 
68. See Nemir v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc., 6 Fed. App. 266, 275 (6th Cir. 
200 I) (per curiam). 
69. See Nemir, 6 Fed. App. at 275. 
70. See id. at 275, 275 n.8. 
71. 184 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 1999). 
72. See Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 494-95 (6th Cir. 1999). 
73. See Greenwell, 184 F.3d at 496-98. 
74. See id. at 497-98. 
75. See id. 
HeinOnline -- 2002 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 845 2002
2002] Cat in the Hat Moves to Michigan 845 
not hang together or make much sense and that threaten to sink the Michigan 
bar in an evidentiary morass reminiscent of the Seussian feline's slick tricks. 
It all began about fifty years ago when Michigan adopted the Frye test 
in People v. Davis.76 Thus, in Michigan state courts, the Frye test became 
known as the Davis/Frye test, a standard that has persisted, generally 
speaking, even after the adoption of the Michigan Rules of Evidence (MRE). 
In fact, the Davis/Frye test does seem perfectly attuned to the language of 
MRE 702 which provides: 
If the court detennines that recognized scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier offact to understand the evidence or to detennine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the fonn of an opinion or otherwise.77 
It should be immediately apparent that, unlike FRE 702, MRE 702 
applies only to "recognized scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge.'>7B In effect, it was the absence of the word "recognized," or a 
word or phrase synonymous with it, that led the U.S. Supreme Court to decide 
in Daubert that unamended FRE 702 was incompatible with and superseded 
the federal Frye test.'9 Although FRE 702 has since been amended to bring 
it into line with Daubert and Kumho, BO MRE 702 has not been changed since 
the trilogy was handed down. This means that new FRE 702 and MRE 702 
potentially have drawn somewhat closer in meaning: the revised federal rule's 
insistence on the reliability of underlying principles and methods and their 
application parallels (more so than the federal rule without such a 
requirement) the Michigan rule's continued insistence that the expert's 
recognized scientific knowledge undergird his or her opinion. Whether the 
difference between "reliable" and "recognized" should sustain a difference in 
the evolving case law as between the federal courts and the Michigan state 
courts, the former continue to operate full-throttle under Daubert-Kumho 
while the latter continue, theoretically, to adhere to Davis/Frye.BI 
I use the term "theoretically" quite intentionally. In spite of the 
Michigan state judiciary's lip service to the primacy of Davis/Frye, 82 things 
76. 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955). 
77. MICH. R. EVID. 702. 
78. [d. (emphasis added). 
79. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
80. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra notes 14-53 and accompanying text. 
82. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. "[T]he Davis/Frye test will remain 
the standard in Michigan unless the Michigan Supreme Court explicitly rejects it." MICHAEL 
D. WADE & HON. DENNIS C. KOLENDA, MICHIGAN COURTROOM EVIDENCE 7-21 (The Institute 
of Continuing Legal Education 3rd ed. Supp. 2002). 
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are, in actuality, more complicated and awfully peculiar in an unmanageable 
pinkish-spot-sort-of-way. Recently, the Michigan Court of Appeals has 
appeared to be applying Davis/Frye in tandem with Daubert - as if the two 
formulations were not inherently contradictory. For instance, in Dempsey v. 
Pease,83 a medical malpractice suit, the appeals court expressly remarked that, 
under MRE 702, it was applying "Daubert, and Frye to the instant case.,,84 
The appeals court pulled an equally perplexing stunt in Spect Imaging, Inc. v. 
Allstate Insurance CO.,85 by instructing the trial court on remand to use, under 
MRE 702, Davis/Frye in tandem with a reliability requirement borrowed not 
from Daubert, but, rather, from another Michigan court of appeals case86 that 
references Daubert without fully adhering to Daubert's thinking. That is, in 
Spect Imaging, the appeals court adopted a reliability requirement with respect 
to the expert's underlying data;87 but, unlike Daubert, the Spect Imaging court 
found that the requirement emanates out ofMRE 702's unique language (the 
testimony must derive from "recognized [medical] [or other scientific] 
knowledge")88 and found that the expert's "inferences or assertions must be 
supported by appropriate objective and independent validation based on what 
is known, e.g., scientific and medical literature,,89 - the latter condition 
unmistakeably echoing the Davis/Frye "general acceptance" standard. And, 
according to Spect Imaging, this analog to Davis/Frye is a "must" that 
somehow is supposed to co-exist with Daubert's more flexible criteria. The 
Spect Imaging approach is in sharp contrast to that upon which the court of 
appeals had relied five years earlier in People v. McMillan.90 In McMillan, the 
court had exclusively looked to the Davis/Frye test while observing that 
Davis/Frye is "more rigorous" than Daubert,91 implying a certain 
inconsistency between the two standards. 
83. No. 222894 & No. 225065, 2001 WL 1547896 (Mich. App. Dec. 4, 2001) (per 
curiam) (unpublished opinion). 
84. Dempsey v. Pease, No. 222894 & No. 225065, 2001 WL 1547896, at *5 (Mich. 
App. Dec. 4, 2001) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion). 
85. 246 Mich. App. 568,633 N.W.2d 461 (2001). 
86. See Spect Imaging, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 246 Mich. App. 568,633 N. W.2d 461 
(2001). The referenced case is Nelson v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 223 Mich. App. 485, 491-92, 566 
N.W.2d 671,673-74 (1997), in which the Michigan Court of Appeals adopted a reliability test 
for the expert's underlying data as described in the text accompanying notes 40-43. 
87. See Spect Imaging, Inc., 246 Mich. App. at 575-76, 633 N.W.2d at 467-68. 
88. Id. at 578-79,633 N. W.2d at 467-68 (citations omitted) (first alteration in original). 
89. Id. at 578-79, 633 N.W.2d at 467. 
90. 213 Mich. App. 134,539 N.W.2d 553 (1995). 
91. See People v. McMillan, 213 Mich. App. 134, 137 n.2, 539 N.W.2d 553, 555 n.2 
(1995). 
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From a logical standpoint, the court may have got it right in McMillan, 
not because Davis/Frye is necessarily a better test, but precisely because 
Davis/Frye is stricter than Daubert such that the two tests are basically 
irreconcilable. Consider: Davis/Frye requires that novel scientific expert 
testimony is inadmissible unless the pertinent scientific community has 
signified its general acceptance of the theory or technique underlying the 
testimony; yet, Daubert would leave the door open to possible admissibility 
ofthat same testimony, even ifthere were no such general acceptance, as long 
as other sufficient reliability factors were satisfied. In other words, if a 
litigant were to call Galileo as an expert witness in a seventeenth-century 
court governed by the MRE, as interpreted by the state appeals court, that 
befuddled court would simultaneously be compelled to allow him to and to 
forbid him from testifying that the planets circle the sun. Not good. 
(Incidentally, thus far Michigan does not embrace Kumho either.92 So, 
under MRE 702, the Davis/Frye standard, or Davis/Frye/Daubert, only is 
triggered when scientific expert testimony is offered.) 
Ah, but that is not all. The cat's fondness for playing games in Michigan 
seems to have been all too pronounced. In 1996, the Michigan legislature 
supplemented MRE 702 with MCLA section 600.2955.93 This statutory 
addition, part of a larger state effort at tort reform, is applicable in tort 
actions.94 Its subsection (2) embodies the Davis/Frye test when novel 
scientific expert testimony is offered, but with the caveat that "general 
acceptance" must be achieved "among impartial and disinterested experts in 
the field.,,9s Its subsection (1) provides, however, that when conventional or 
"un-novel" scientific expert opinion testimony is offered, the expert's 
testimony must be reliable and assist the trier of fact, i.e., be relevant to the 
issues in the case.96 Subsection (1) further provides that 
[i]n making that determination, the court shall examine the [expert's] opinion and the 
basis for the opinion, which basis includes the facts, technique, methodology, and 
reasoning relied on by the expert, and shall consider all ofthe following factors: 
(a) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to scientific testing 
and replication. 
92. My research has revealed no cases in which the Michigan Court of Appeals or 
Supreme Court has adopted the Kumho doctrine. 
93. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.2955 (West 2000). 
94. The statute applies "[i]n an action for the death of a person or for injury to a person 
or property." § 600.2955(1). See Hon. Daniel P. Ryan, Expert Opinion Testimony and Scientific 
Evidence: Does MCL. § 600.2955 "Assist" the Trial Judge in Michigan Tort Cases?, 75 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REv. 263, 265 (1998). 
95. § 600.2955(2). 
96. See § 600.2955(1). 
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(b) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to peer review 
publication. 
(c) The existence and maintenance of generally accepted standards governing 
the application and interpretation of a methodology or technique and 
whether the opinion and its basis are consistent with those standards. 
(d) The known or potential error rate of the opinion and its basis. 
(e) The degree to which the opinion and its basis are generally accepted within 
the relevant expert community. As used in this subdivision, "relevant 
expert community" means individuals who are knowledgeable in the 
field of study and are gainfully employed applying that knowledge on 
the free market. 
(f) Whether the basis for the opinion is reliable and whether experts in that 
field would rely on the same basis to reach the type of opinion being 
proffered. 
(g) Whether the opinion or methodology is relied upon by experts outside of 
the context oflitigation.97 
Subsection (1) plainly and significantly departs from Daubert in a 
number of respects. Whereas Daubert's list of reliability factors is not 
mandatory or exhaustive,98 section 600.2955(1)'s list is both mandatory and 
exhaustive.99 Moreover, Daubert's multifactor reliability analysis applies 
both to novel and. "un-novel" scientific expert testimonylOO while 
section 600.2955(1) applies instead only to conventional scientific expert 
testimony. 101 
97. [d. (emphasis added). 
98. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
99. That section 600.2955(I)'s list off actors is mandatory is indicated by the statute's 
direction that "all" enumerated factors "shall" be considered by the trial court. See 
§ 600.2955(1); see a/so Ryan. supra note 94, at 269. 
100. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; see a/so id. at 592 nn. 8 & II. 
101. See section 600.2955(2), which governs when only"[ a] novel methodology or form 
of scientific evidence may be admitted into evidence." § 600.2955(2) (emphasis added). In 
contrast, section 600.2955(1) governs scientific evidence without the adjective "novel" or any 
ofits synonyms. See WADE & KOLENDA, supra note 82, at 7-19 to 7-20. 
It should be noted, however, that scientific evidence which, at the beginning of 
analysis under section 600.2955, was novel may yet end up facing the obstacles of both 
subsections (1) and (2). As one commentator has explained, 
[t]o be admissible under Section 2955(2), novel scientific evidence must be generally 
accepted, as before. However, once the proponent proves that the "novel 
methodology or form of scientific evidence . . . has achieved general scientific 
acceptance," the evidence will no longer be novel, by definition. That formerly novel 
technique or "form of scientific evidence" must now be reanalyzed, along with other 
non-novel evidence, as part ofthe basis for the opinion. 
Mary Elizabeth Lowe, Scientific Testimony in Michigan: Testing the Experts, 13 T.M. COOLEY 
L. REv. 207, 240-41 (1996)( citations omitted). 
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Some of the reliability factors set forth in section 600.2955(1) also differ 
substantially in their nature from those described in Daubert so as to make the 
state hurdle for admissibility much tougher to get by. On the one hand, 
Daubert states that a reliability factor may be whether the expert's underlying 
theory or technique has been subject to peer review and publication and notes 
that publication is but one element of peer review. 102 According to Daubert, 
publication is not always "a sine qua non of admissibility."103 The Michigan 
statute, on the other hand, specifically requires "peer review publication."I04 
Another example of the differences is apparent in a comparison of Daubert's 
"general acceptance" factor with that of section 600.2955(1)(e). It will be 
recalled that Daubert takes the position that one reliability factor may be 
whether there is "general acceptance" of the expert's underlying theory or 
technique in the relevant scientific community. IDS However, section 
600.2955(1)(e) makes the "general acceptance" test mandatory and requires 
its application both to the basis of the expert's opinion and to the opinion 
itself.I06 Section 600.2955( 1)( e) also defines "relevant expert community" to 
mean "individuals who are knowledgeable in the field of study and are 
gainfully employed applying that knowledge on the free market,"107 thereby 
arguably eliminating many highly qualified experts hailing from government 
and academia; 108 this limitation is not present under Daubert. And there is 
more. 
Section 600.2955(1) treats as mandatory two reliability criteria that are 
not even mentioned in Daubert. That is, section 600.2955(1)(f) directs the 
trial judge to assess whether experts in the field would rely on the same basis 
to reach the type of expert opinion being proffered; 109 and, 
section 600.2955(1)(g) requires the trial judge to assess whether the expert's 
opinion or underlying methodology is relied upon by experts outside of the 
102. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. 
103. Id. at 593. 
104. § 600.2955(1)(b). 
105. The Daubert Court stated: 
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its overarching 
subject is the scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and 
reliability-()f the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of 
course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that 
they generate. 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 (citation omitted). 
106. The Michigan statute lists as a reliability factor, "[t]he degree to which the opinion 
and its basis are generally accepted within the relevant expert community." § 600.2955(1)(e). 
107. Id. 
108. See Ryan, supra note 94, at 271. 
109. See § 600.2955(1)(f). 
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litigation context. IIO Finally, as mentioned previously, section 600.2955(1) 
applies solely to conventional scientific expert testimony and 
section 600.2955(2) applies solely to novel scientific testimony while 
Daubert's principles, through Kumho, apply to all expert testimony. III 
Some commentators have contended that section 600.2955 represents the 
Michigan legislature's attempt to effectuate a compromise by codifying both 
Daubert and Frye as one statutory provision. 112 An attempt it may be. But it 
is not a very successful one if compromise means integrating Daubert, intact, 
into Michigan state law. The reason that Daubert gets shortchanged in section 
600.2955 is twofold. First, insofar as subsection (1) of section 600.2955 is 
concerned, its inclusion of the "general acceptance" test as a mandatory 
reliability factor undercuts any seeming flexibility flowing from the 
subsection's enumeration of other less stringent reliability factors as well; 113 
this is because the "general acceptance" test, as the most demanding factor, 
ends up being the real sine qua non for admissibility. Thus, Davis/Frye 
dominates subsection (1) despite appearances otherwise. Second, the very 
wording of subsection (2) leaves no doubt that Davis/Frye also dominates it. 114 
Section 600.2955 became effective about six years ago. Yet, there still 
is precious little case law applying the statute. And, the few decisions that do 
exist on the topic are singularly unedifying. Take, for instance, McBride v. 
Chrysler Corp.,'ls a products liability suit in which plaintiff called as an 
expert witness Georg Muller, a mechanical engineer with extensive training 
and experience in auto accident reconstruction and the operation of motor 
vehicle components. 116 The trial court prevented Muller from testifying on the 
ground that his area of expertise was not relevant to establishing the defect in 
controversy. 117 The appeals court subsequently identified as one of the 
remaining issues on appeal whether section 600.2955 was applicable to the 
case so as to preclude Muller's testimony - an issue on which the trial court 
110. See § 600.2955(1)(g). 
III. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
112. See JAMES K. ROBINSON & RONALD S. LONGHOFER, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON 
MICHIGAN EVIDENCE 397-98 (West 2002). 
lB. See id. at 399; Lowe, supra note 101, at 238. 
114. See Ryan, supra note 94, at 273. 
liS. No. 223891,2002 WL 99704 (Mich. App. Jan. 22, 2002)(per curiam)(unpublished 
opinion). 
116. See McBride v. Chrysler Corp., No. 223891, 2002 WL 99704, at ·1, ·1 n.2 (Mich. 
App. Jan. 22, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion). 
117. See McBride, 2002 WL 99704, at ·1-·2. 
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had not ruled. lIB For a variety of reasons, none of them interesting for 
purposes of this article, the appeals court declined to reach that issue.lI9 
Or, there is Daraban v. State,120 a negligence case brought for the 
wrongful death of plaintiffs decedent who died when his car went off the 
Mackinac Bridge.121 On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court had 
erroneously admitted the '''psychological autopsy'" of defendant's expert 
witness, Dr. Cheryl King, to prove that decedent's death was a suicide.122 The 
trial court had, it turns out, admitted the testimony without addressing the 
mandatory standards of section 600.2955. 123 The appellate court found that 
omission to be error, but not reversible error inasmuch as ample other 
evidence had been introduced to support a finding of suicide. 124 
A third and generally unilluminating case is Greathouse v. Rhodes,125 a 
medical malpractice action in which plaintiff wished to present standard of 
care experts at trial and to question them, in front of the jury, with learned 
treatises on the diagnosis and treatment of unstable angina. 126 Plaintiffs 
alleged purpose in offering the treatises was, she said, to establish under 
section 600.2955(1) that her experts' opinions (on the standard of care and 
defendants' failure to comply with that standard) were based on accepted 
scientific standards and otherwise met the requirements of section 
600.2955(1 ).127 The court of appeals framed the issue as whether section 
600.2955( 1) provides a basis for the admission of evidence that, but for that 
provision, would be inadmissible - here, the learned treatises. 128 The court of 
appeals reasoned that section 600.2955(1) is not a rule of evidence, does not 
displace the MRE, and does not allow a party to establish her expert 
witnesses' reliability through criteria that section 600.295 5( 1) directs only the 
trial j udge to employ.129 Therefore, the appeals court held that a party may not 
118. See id. at ·3. 
119. See id. 
120. No. 223659, 2002 WL 345545 (Mich. App. Mar. 5, 2002) (per curiam) 
(unpublished opinion). 
121. See Daraban v. State, No. 223659, 2002 WL 345545, at ·1 (Mich. App. Mar. 5, 
2002) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion). 
122. See Daraban, 2002 WL 345545, at·1. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
125. 242 Mich. App. 221, 618 N.W.2d 106 (2000), rev'd in part on other grounds,_ 
Mich. -,636 N.W.2d 138 (2001). 
126. Greathousev. Rhodes, 242 Mich. App. 221, 618 N.W.2d 106 (2000), rev'dinpart 
on other grounds, _ Mich. -,636 N.W.2d 138 (2001). 
127. See Greathouse, 242 Mich. App. at 226-27, 618 N.W.2d at 109. 
128. See id. at 236-40, 618 N.W.2d at 114-15. 
129. See id. at 238-40,618 N.W.2d at 115. 
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use section 600.2955(1) as authority to admit treatise evidence at trial; 130 
rather, a party's attempt to show the reliability of her experts before the jury 
must be accomplished through and in a manner consistent with the MRE.131 
At bottom, the court seems to have been concerned that plaintiff was not really 
trying to place evidence of reliability before the trial court, but was seeking 
to pull a fast one by misusing section 600.2955 as a vehicle to bolster her 
experts' testimony with corroborative medical evidence. 132 Greathouse, then, 
aside from this one narrow point involving the use oflearned treatises, sheds 
little light on the proper workings of section 600.2955. 
CONCLUSION 
As The Cat in the Hat Comes Back draws to a close, the cat (and his 26 
little helper cats) are stumped by the ever expanding pink spot. 133 Stumped, 
that is, until the big cat summons little cat Z to use a secret weapon: Voom. 134 
All that we are told about Voom is: 
"Voom is so hard to get, 
You never saw anything 
Like it, I bet. 
Why, Voom cleans up anything 
Clean as can be!"J3S 
"Voom" sounds an awful lot like clear thinking - hard to come by and an 
effective antidote for many a muddle. In any event, Voom, whatever it is, 
does the trick. The pink blob disappears, and the main cat-in-charge then can 
triumphantly declare: 
130. See id. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. at n.S. 
"So you see!" laughed the Cat, 
"Now your snow is all white! 
Now your work is all done! 
Now your house is all right!,,136 
133. See DR. SEUSS, supra note I, at 30-54. 
134. See id. at 54-57. 
135. Id. at 57. 
136. Id. at 61. 
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As things stand, Michigan's rules on the admissibility of scientific expert 
opinion testimony are exasperatingly confusing and inconsistent. If only 
Voom were clear thinking, manifested as sage legislative reform and prompt 
curative intervention by the Michigan Supreme Court; if only we could, 
Recruit wee cat Z, Voom in paws, 
The pinkish Seussian snafu 
In Michigan's evidence laws 
To clean up and correctly redo! 137 
137. Okay, so it's not Dr. Seuss. 
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